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ENFORCEMENT OF PROXY REGULATIONS IN
PARENT-SUBSIDIARY MERGERS
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934' and its implementing regulations2
control the issuance of proxy statements.3 This legislation is intended to
prohibit use of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy statements to
obtain shareholder authorization of corporate transactions.' Moreover, the
scope of this prohibition and, consequently, the enforcement powers of the
courts have been held to be broad rather than restrictive. This stance is.
deemed necessary to ensure the investor's right to an informed appraisal
of corporate action.'
Although the proxy regulations apply with few exceptions to every so-
licitation of a proxy,' protection of investors' appraisal rights is of particu-
lar importance in the case of parent-subsidiary mergers.7 While negotiation
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1970 and Supp. V 1975).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 to .14f-1 (1977).
Id. For the purposes of the proxy regulations, "proxy" includes a consent or authoriza-
tion. Id., § 240.14a-l(d). The regulations define "solicitation" as any request for a proxy,
request for action on a proxy, or other communication calculated to result in the same. Id. §
240.14a-1(f). In substance, the proxy regulations require a schedule of information to be
furnished to security holders. Id. § § 240.14a-3, .14a-101, in a clear presentation. Id. § 240.14a-
5. In addition, the regulations prohibit statements
containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances
under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or
which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier
communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or
subject matter which has become false or misleading.
Id. § 240.14a-9(a).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934); S.
REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934). In 1964, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
purpose of § 14a as a measure to prevent deceptive or inadequate disclosure. J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
Id. at 432-34. The securities legislation was enacted for remedial rather than technical
purposes and thus should be construed "flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes." SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963); see, e.g., Pierre J. LeLan-
dais & Co. v. MDS-Atron, Inc., 543 F.2d 421, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
786 (1977); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 748-49 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968). Thus, in 1964, the Supreme Court held that a private action was appropriate in the
case of a proxy violation, J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964), and in 1970
held that the defrauded shareholder need not prove reliance on a material defect of a proxy
statement to establish his cause of action. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-
85 (1970).
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (1977).
Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L.
REv. 297, 301 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brudney & Chirelstein]. Although Brudney and
Chirelstein recognize the importance of adequate disclosure in mergers between parent and
subsidiary corporations, those authors have little confidence in the ability of the disclosure
requirements alone to protect the rights of minority shareholders adequately. Id. at 301-03.
They would prefer a substantive rather than procedural standard of conduct in parent-
subsidiary mergers to protect minority shareholder interests. Id. at 313-25.
256 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
of merger terms in non parent-subsidiary mergers is adversary in nature,8
a parent corporation often controls its subsidiary's management.9 Such
control necessarily precludes adversary negotiation,"0 and may result in
merger terms that operate to the detriment of the subsidiary's minority
shareholders." Consequently, adequate disclosure is necessary so that
shareholders may analyze the transaction with the additional caution that
parent-subsidiary mergers warrant.'" Since the proxy information often
will be issued by the subsidiary's management, the parent corporation may
cause a deceptive proxy statement to be issued, thereby depriving the
minority shareholders of their right to informed appraisal of the transac-
tion.'3 The significance of parent-subsidiary mergers, therefore, is that
I See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 n.6 (1970); text accompanying
notes 55-64 infra.
9 Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 297-98. When a parent corporation acquires
the majority or a substantial amount of another corporation's stock, that parent corporation
often will establish a parent-subsidiary relationship. By election of common or dummy direc-
tors to the board of directors of the subsidiary corporation, the parent may exercise some
degree of control over the subsidiary and its operation and, thus, exercise greater control of
the investment. Id. at 297. Occasionally, the parent will acquire ownership or control of
another corporation's stock only as a transitory step to merger. In such cases, the acquiring
corporation will obtain either through tender offers or on the market, only the amount of stock
that is necessary to ensure shareholder ratification of the merger. There often is neither the
time nor necessity to create a parent-subsidiary relationship through the election process.
Thus, merger negotiations in these "two-step" mergers are at arms length and do not pose
the identical problem as arises in true parent-subsidiary mergers. Id. at 346. Two-step merg-
ers, however, raise questions concerning the acquisition of the controlling shares, but such
questions lie outside the scope of the proxy regulations. Id. at 330-46.
"* See Id. at 298; Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'd
on other grounds, 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
" Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 298. The parent-subsidiary relationship illus-
trates a classic self dealing problem. Id. The parent must balance the often competing inter-
ests of its own shareholders against the fiduciary duty owed the public shareholders of the
subsidiary. Since parent corporations often perceive a primary loyalty to their own sharehold-
erg, the interests of such shareholders may be furthered to the exclusion or detriment of
minority shareholder interests. Id.
" Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 n.6 (1970). One of the most serious
proxy defects is an omission to disclose to shareholders the close relationship between corpo-
rations. Id. The result of such deception is that the shareholders may rely on the recommen-
dations of their management as objective. Id. If this relationship were known, the sharehold-
ers might subject the transaction to higher scrutiny. Id. Regardless of whether that transac-
tion would or would not be approved under this scrutiny, failure to disclose the relationship
defeats "the congressional policy of ensuring that the shareholders are able to make an
informed choice when they are consulted on corporate transactions." Id. at 385, and is, as a
matter of law, a material violation of the proxy xegulations. Mills v. Electric Auto-Life Co.,
403 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1968). See also Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415
F.2d 1326, 1330-31 (7th Cir. 1969).
,1 Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 300. The investor's right to informed appraisal
of corporate tranactions, as distinguished from statutory appraisal remedies, is derived from
congressional policy of ensuring the investor an informed choice whenever proxy statements
are involved. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970). This right should not
in any way be limited by the number or scope of choices available to the investor. See, id. at
384 n.6. Such choices will depend on the circumstances of each transaction, state statutes
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such transactions may vest in the parent corporation an incentive to cir-
cumvent informed minority shareholder appraisal, coupled with the capac-
ity to attain that end. 4 Thus, the very nature of the parent-subsidiary
relationship renders such mergers suspect and enforcement of the proxy
regulations critical.'5
Clearly, the remedy for a proxy violation must effectuate the legislative
requirement of adequate disclosure." Prospective relief often is available
and the corporate charters involved. Thus, in the case of parent-subsidiary mergers, if share-
holder ratification is required by statute or charter, the minority shareholders are entitled to
the protection of the proxy regulations. This protection is.not necessarily extinguished when
the parent corporation's subsidiary holdings alone are sufficient to effect ratification. Id. at
385 n.7; see e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.64 (1954) (Smith-Hurd). When, however, the
parent holds a large majority of the stock of its subsidiary, generally over 90%, unless the
particular corporate charter requires otherwise, a short form merger statute may enable the
parent to avoid ratification, proxy statements and, thereby, the proxy regulations. See, e.g.,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.66a (Supp. 1977) (Smith-Hurd). Investor options and conse-
quently the need for adequate disclosure are not limited to the possibility of ratifying or
rejecting a corporate action. The shareholder may have the opportunity to sell his shares on
the market, Brudney, A NOTE ON GOING PRIVATE, 61 VA. L. REv. 1019, 1039 n.69 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Brudney], or seek the statutory appraisal remedy. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. titl. 8, § 262 (a-f) (1974). Statutory appraisal remedies provide the dissenting share-
holder an independent appraisal of the value of his stock. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note
7, at 304-05. The corporation then will be required to purchase such stock at the appraised
value. Id. If a number of shareholders elect the statutory appraisal remedy, the forced acquisi-
tion may weaken severely the corporation's liquidity. Thus, the mere threat of such action
may inspire settlement between the corporation and its shareholders. Id. Appraisal, however,
is not an actual remedy, as there is no requirement of an injury. Rather, appraisal is a
corporate peace-keeping measure designed to balance the possibilities of minority harassment
against parent overreaching. Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Ap-
praisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1216-17 (1964). Thus, in the case of a parent-subsidiary
merger, appraisal does not provide the dissenting minority shareholder with any portion of
the gain which results from that transaction. °Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 305.
Moreover, the appraisal statutes often will further limit the scope of recovery available to the
dissenting minority shareholder. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (1974). Yet when
the minority shareholders have no options with regard to the proposed corporate action, the
requirement for complete and accurate disclosure may prevent blatant mistreatment of such
shareholders by exposing corporate activity to public scrutiny. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra
note 7, at 301.
" Id. at 298-300.
" Id.
" Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 432 (1964). The proxy regulations are particularly suited to private enforcement.
Such enforcement requires that an effective right of recovery be provided to injured share-
holders. Id. at 433. Moreover, the securities legislation was enacted for the purpose of avoiding
fraud and, thus, should be construed flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes. Pierre J.
Lelandais & Co. v. MDS-Atron, Inc., 543 F.2d 421, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1976); Myzel v. Fields,
386 F.2d 718, 748-49 (8th Cir. 1967); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 195 (1963). Remedial flexibility is necessary in the context of parent-subsidiary mergers
because, "[t]he very nature of most cases precludes proof of value and damage with the
precision of mathematical computation." Ahlenius v. Bunn & Humphreys, Inc., 358 Ill. 155,
192 N.E. 824, 829 (1934). Since the equities favor the defrauded party when securities laws
are violated, see Note, The Measure of Damages in 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded
Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371, 883-84 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Measure of Damages],
1978]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
to preserve the investor's right to informed appraisal of the particular
corporate action. 7 When the defects in a proxy statement are discovered
before consummation of the transaction for which proxies were sought, the
courts may enjoin use of the defective statement as well as any proxies
already obtained. 8 Since an injunction may require correction of the state-
ment defects as a prerequisite to further solicitation, this prospective en-
forcement of the proxy regulations safeguards the investor appraisal
right.9
When the proxy statement defects are discovered after the transaction
has been effected, however, retrospective action is necessary to remedy the
loss of the investor appraisal right." One form of retrospective relief is
rescission of the transaction that was the subject of the defective state-
ment." Rescission returns the parties to the transaction to their original
positions. Again, rescission forewarns the issuer that adequate disclosure
is required for resolicitation.
2
Rescission often is inappropriate, however, due to conditions both of
logistics and equity.21 In such cases, there is no method of returning the
the risk of uncertainty as to the amount of damages should fall on the wrongdoer. Gould v.
American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 782-84 (3d Cir. 1976). When the fiduciary ex-
pressly states a price is fair, courts may impose a higher duty to disclose, thereby lessening
the degree of proof necessary to establish a proxy violation. Tanzer v. Haynie, 405 F. Supp.
650, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Furthermore, even the attorney-client privilege may be set aside
to allow discovery of information pertaining to the fairness of the transaction. Valente v.
Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 366-70 (D. Del. 1975). While the outcome of such flexibility may
appear draconian when the inadequacy in a proxy statement is more a failure of articulation
than an attempt to deceive, Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1304 (2d Cir.
1973), motive is unimportant under the proxy regulations, Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 748
(8th Cir. 1967). Moreover, since a proxy statement misrepresentation or omission which does
not have a sufficient propensity to induce uninformed investor appraisal is not a material
violation of the proxy regulations and as such is not actionable, material violations and the
resultant injuries should be corrected regardless of why the violations occurred. See Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970).
'7 See Id. at 386.
11 Id. at 383. In addition to prohibiting use of false or misleading proxy statements, the
proxy regulations also bar the use of proxies obtained through illegal solicitation. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-1 (1977). Such proxies are ineffective for their stated purpose when timely chal-
lenged. Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 1041, 1071-72 (1960).
11 See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1970). An injunction against
a defective proxy statement forestalls not only loss of the investor appraisal right, but also
ancillary injuries caused by the deception. See text accompanying notes 77-132 infra.
" Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386 (1970); see note 16 supra. In the sense
that effective remedies for proxy violations discourage future violations, effective retrospec-
tive action also may be said to serve a prospective remedial function. See Gould v. American-
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 782-84 (3d Cir. 1976).
2 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386 (1970).
22 Id. at 386-87. Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act provides that contracts
made in violation of the Act are void "as regards the rights of" the violator. 15 U.S.C. §
78cc(b) (1970).
1 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1240, 1242 (7th Cir. 1977). The language of §
29 of the Securities Exchange Act has been interpreted to mean that fraudulently induced
transactions under the Act are not void per se, but are voidable at the option of the injured
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parties to the status quo ante and providing the investor an informed
reassessment of the corporate action. Thus, the retrospective remedy for
loss of the investor's appraisal right and, consequently, enforcement of the
disclosure requirements often will be limited to monetary relief.24 Since the
courts usually cannot predict what assessment the investor would have
made had there been no deception, or, for example, what merger terms the
shareholder would accept under the true state of facts, the investor ap-
praisal right cannot be valued monetarily.2 The relief awarded the de-
frauded investor, then, must be premised on other considerations.
2
1
In any action for monetary relief from a proxy violation, the courts
necessarily must shift their analyses from the conceptual injury, loss of the
investor appraisal right, to the more tangible effects or manifestations of
that injury.Y Clearly, the primary effect of the violation is that the transac-
tion occurred. While rescission of the entire transaction may not be appro-
priate,2 18 the courts can correct certain manifestations of that transaction
to remedy injury to the defrauded investor or to effectuate the disclosure
requirements of the proxy regulations. 29 For example, the courts could
party. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 387 (1970). Moreover, since in the case
of a parent-subsidiary merger, the parties to that transaction are the two corporations, id. at
388, the injury, and thus the right to rescind the transaction, vests in the corporation and
not the shareholders. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). The defrauded share-
holder might have the right to rescind his own proxies under § 29(b). Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388 n.11 (1970). The right to bring a derivative action in the name of
the defrauded corporation, however, is limited in that rescission will be granted only if it is
in the best interest of the shareholders as a whole, presumably including the parent corpora-
tion as shareholder. Id. at 388. Rescission in parent-subsidiary mergers, then, is outside the
scope of § 29(b), and will be granted only "if a court of equity concludes, from all the
circumstances, that it would be equitable to do so." Id. Thus, there is no requirement that a
court "unscramble a corporate transaction merely because a violation occurred." Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1968). In Basch v. Talley Indus., Inc., 53
F.R.D. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), decided under Delaware law, the court further reduced this right
by ruling that once two corporations have merged, the injured corporation and derivatively,
the corporation's premerger shareholders could no longer sue to rescind the merger as a unity
of interest arose after the merger. Id. at 11-12. But see Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (decided under Pennsylvania law). In Basch, the court did allow the share-
holders of the defrauded corporation to maintain a class action for rescission, but refused to
grant that remedy since the merger involved thousands of shareholders, millions of outstand-
ing shares, and innumerable transactions involving sales of that stock to good faith purchasers
during the year between merger and suit. 53 F.R.D. at 12.
24 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388 (1970).
25 Id. at 382 n.5. Since investors may not always premise their investment decisions on
the adequacy of the acquisition price of a merger, accurate reconstruction of the investor's
decision is impossible. Id. An exception ariseswhen the proxy misstatement occurs in the
merger terms. In those cases, the remedy afforded the defrauded minority shareholders is an
accounting to ensure that such shareholders received the amount represented by the merger
terms. Id. at 388. '
25 Id. at 388-89.
27 Id.
See note 23 supra; note 82 infra.
" Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1970).
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award the injured investor the measure of his actual damages, 3 or the sum
of profits that accrue to the issuer of the defective proxy statement 3'
Clearly, monetary remedy for a proxy violation should act to safeguard
the investor appraisal right, as do the remedies of injunction and rescis-
sion.32 When faced with a claim for monetary relief, the court must make
I Id. at 389. In Mills, the Supreme Court suggested that damages may be awarded to
defrauded minority shareholders to compensate for the reduced earnings potential of their
holdings or to remedy the unfairness of the merger terms. Id. The Court, however, did caution
that "damages should be recoverable only to the extent that they can be shown." Id. In
Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972), the
Seventh Circuit interpreted this statement to indicate that damages may be awarded on a
showing that the shareholders would have been better off without the merger, or that such
shareholders could have received a better exchange rate. Id. at 31. These possibilities,
however, were "not intended to exclude others." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375, 389 (1970); see note 16 supra.
' Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972). Section 28 of the
Securities Exchange Act, provides that the rights and remedies available under the act are
in addition to any other rights and remedies, except that there may be no award for damages
in excess of the actual damages suffered. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970). In 1975, however, the
Supreme Court held that damages allowable under § 28 are to be measured by the greater
of the difference between the fair value of what the injured party received for his property
and the fair value of what should have been received absent the fraud, or the wrongdoer's
profits. 406 U.S. at 155. The first alternative, plaintiff's actual damages, is the traditional
remedy available to the defrauded buyer of property. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 748
(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). The disgorging-of defendant's profit ration-
ale, known as the "Janigan theory," was recognized in the context of the proxy regulations
in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1304 (2d Cir. 1973). While in the "buyer"
cases, damages should not include "the expected fruits of an unrealized speculation," Sigafus
v. Porter, 179 U.S. 116, 125 (1900); see Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971);
Estate Counseling Serv. Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527,
533 (10th Cir. 1962); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 825-26 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd,
319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963), the profits of a defendant who fraudulently induced another to
sell his property "are subject to another factor, viz; that they accrued to the fraudulent
party." Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). Thus,
equity demands that the defrauded party be awarded such profits rather than let the wrong-
doer keep them and thereby affirm him actions. See Falk v. Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 109, 135 N.E.
243 (1922); People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 341, 110 N.E. 945, 950 (1915); Rice v. Price,
340 Mass. 502, 164 N.E.2d 891, 894-95 (1960); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970); 3 L. Loss, SECURITES
REGULATIONS 1793-94 (2d ed. 1961); 4 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 507, 508, 508.1 (3d
ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 151, 202, Comments b,c (1937); RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 549 (1977). The Janigan theory is limited in that the wrongdoer must have
acquired the property by fraud, his profits must have been a proximate consequence of that
fraud, and those profits must not be more directly attributable to the wrongdoer's talents
than to the value of the fraudulently acquired property. For example, if an artist were to
acquire paint and canvas fraudulently, the seller of that property could not claim the result-
ing masterpiece. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786-87 (1st Cir. 1965). In addition, there
may be a requirement that the profits were realized. Id. at 786. But see Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1305 (2d Cir. 1973) (defendant required to account for unrealized
increase in stock value).
32 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964). In Borak the Supreme Court held that
the courts have a duty "to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective
the congressional purpose." Id. Moreover, the court held that the creation of a federally
protected right carries with that creation the power to enforce the right and the power to
enforce further implies the power to grant any necessary remedy. Id. at 433-35. One problem
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several elections upon which the existence and amount of an award will
depend. First, the court must decide which effects or manifestations of the
transaction are to be examined. Second, these manifestations and their
degree must be ascertained. For example, if a court decides to premise
any award to the defrauded investor on the difference between the premer-
ger and postmerger values of the investor's corporation, the court must
value the corporation before and after the merger to ascertain the occur-
rence and amount of any change in value.m There are many approaches
which may be taken in these elections." The courts, however, must act
flexibly in order to ensure that monetary remedies for proxy violations
effectuate the disclosure requirements of the securities legislation.36
In no case is the need for remedial flexibility more apparent than in the
case of parent-subsidiary mergers." Since the determination of corporate
value, particularly for the purposes of a merger, is more a subjective analy-
sis of intangibles than an objective fact, remedial flexibility should extend
to this valuation process.3 The complexity of corporate valuation for merg-
ers is illustrated best by merger negotiations between unaffiliated corpora-
tions.
In its simplest form, a merger is a transaction through which one corpo-
ration is absorbed into another. 9 When two previously unaffiliated corpo-
the courts face when granting remedy of a proxy violation is that such remedies more often
will emphasize the fairness of the transaction than the proxy violation. Yet fairness should
not be a complete defense to a proxy violation. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
381-83 (1970). While unfairness of the transaction may be an important factor on which to
base a damages award, id. at 386, fairness is excluded as a complete defense to a material
proxy violation for several reasons. First, "outrageous misrepresentations in a proxy solicita-
tion" not relating to the terms of the transaction, would not give rise to a cause of action under
§ 14(a). Id. at 382. Consequently, permitting fairness as a defense "would subvert the
congressional purpose of ensuring full and fair disclosure to shareholders." Id. Second, the
risk that shareholders would not be able to rebut the corporation's evidence of fairness would
discourage shareholder suits, and thus, hinder a necessary supplement to SEC enforcement
of the proxy regulations. Id. Third, since fairness does not give rise to a cause of action under
the proxy regulations, a showing of fairness should not act as a defense to an established
violation. See Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 65 (D.N.J. 1974). Moreover, in
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the
unfairness of a merger as evidenced by the inadequacy of the price afforded minority share-
holders or the profits accrued to the wrongdoer does not give rise to an independent cause of
action under federal law. Id. at 1303-04. Such conditions are actionable in federal court only
when they occur ancillary to the violation of a federally protected right. Id.
1 See text accompanying notes 84-120 infra.
31 A. CHOKA, BUYING, SELLING, AND MERGING BUSINESSES 67 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
CHOKA]. Wheii a court awards monetary relief, there must be an election among remedies
and resolution of the crucialvaluation questions in order to award a sum certain to the
defrauded investors. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389 (1970).
3' See notes 30-31 supra; see text accompanying notes 43-54, 84-149 infra.
3' See note 16 supra.
3 See text accompanying notes 6-15 supra.
31 E. HELFERT, VALUATION: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 106 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
HELFERT].
31 Fillman, Cash and Property as Consideration in a Merger or Consolidation, 62 Nw.
U.L. REv. 837 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Fillman].
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rations merge, the initial step in the merger process is negotiation of the
merger terms by the managements of the respective corporations." These
terms then are submitted to the shareholders of the corporations in proxy
statements which also will contain other information pertinent to the
transaction.' The shareholders then return proxies through which they
give authorization for their votes to be cast on their behalf.4"
The negotiation process through which the merger terms are estab-
lished necessarily involves valuation of the respective corporations.43 Reso-
lution of these valuation questions determines the acquisition price of the
merger." The market price of each corporation's stock is the initial consid-
eration in this valuation process. 5 If a corporation's stock is traded actively
on the market, the price of the corporation's shares may be seen as the
appraisal of that corporation's present value by the stock market." In
addition to market price, the parties to a merger also will consider such
factors as dividend ratios, earnings to price ratios, future earnings esti-
mates, book values and asset values in arriving at the merger terms."
40 Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 298.
" Id. at 300; see note 3 supra. The general disclosure requirements of the proxy regula-
tions are supplemented by specific requirements in certain cases. Thus, in the cases of merg-
ers or consolidations as well as certain acquisitions and sales, the solicitation issuer is required
to furnish an explanation of the proposed action, the reasons therefor, and its effects upon
existing shareholders. In addition, when the merger or consolidation is other than between
parent and its totally owned subsidiary, the issuer must include a description of the business
of the merger parties, the location and description of that party's assets, a description of the
economic status of that party, and a description of that corporation's capital structure, the
corporation's recent earnings and its dividends history. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a)-101 (1977).
Furthermore, when the merger or consolidation occurs in such fashion as results in a change
of directors of the acquiring firm, the issuer may be required to provide further information
pertaining to the election of such directors. Id. § 240.14(a)-101 n.A (1977).
42 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970); see note 13 supra. Under
Illinois law, a merger or consolidation requires the affirmative vote of 2/3 of the outstanding
shares entitled to vote. If one or more classes of stock are entitled to vote as a class, the merger
requires the affirmative vote of 2/3 of both the class and the shares as a whole. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 32, § 157.64 (1954) (Smith-Hurd).
'3 HELFERT, supra note 38, at 106.
Id. The complexity of the valuation process is conditioned on the nature of the particu-
lar merger or consolidation. In a merger when one corporation pays cash for the merger
partner's outstanding shares, there is generally only a valuation of the acquired corporation.
When the acquired corporation's shareholders receive stock or debt of the acquirer, however,
those considerations also must be valued. When two corporations join in a newly created third
corporation, the transaction is further complicated. In consolidations, not only must the two
pre-consolidation corporations be valued, but also the value of the stocks or debt issued by
the consolidated entity must be ascertained. See text accompanying notes 83-120 infra. In
addition, the valuation process may be complicated by an expectation of synergy. See text
accompanying notes 49-54 infra.
'3 CHOKA, supra note 34, at 67.
" Central States Elec. Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879, 884 (4th Cir. 1950); see Swanson
v. American Consumers Indus., 475 F.2d 516, 521 (7th Cir. 1973); David J. Green Co. v.
Schenley Industries, 281 A.2d 30, 34 (Del. Ch. 1971); Bastian v. Bournes, Inc., 256 A.2d 680,
683 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 278 A.2d 467 (1970). But see note 48 infra.
'" CHOKA, supra note 34, at 51-65, 67; accord, Batkin & Macauley, Valuation for Mergers
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These factors may disclose a discrepancy between the stock market ap-
praisal of value and a corporation's actual present value."
Factors other than market price also may serve to establish the "merger
value" of a corporation. 9 The merger value is the special value of that
particular corporation to the proposed merged operation.2 The decision of
two nonaffiliated corporations to merge their operations often is premised
on the expectation of a higher return on capital for the resulting combined
enterprise and, consequently, a higher value for that enterprise than the
aggregate value of the individual premerger corporations.5' This increment
in value, called "synergism," may be attributable to reduced competition,
economies of scale, shifting of assets, or a shift in stock market activity.
2
Because synergism is a function of the merger, and as a general rule results
from factors that may not be present in independent operation,O the pre-
merger market price of a corporation's stock will not-reflect this expecta-
tion. Therefore, merger value for the purpose of mergers between nonaffi-
liated corporations must include the expectation of the amount and rela-
and Acquisitions and Financial Reporting, in VALUATION OF CLOSELY HELD BusinsEs 55
(1972). See text accompanying notes 84-89 infra.
4 CHOKA, supra note 34, at 67-68; May, Value Approaches to Investment Decisions, in
READINGS IN INVESTMENT 239 (1965) [hereinafter cited as May]. The value of a business in
the context of its present operation is the "going concern value." This valuation should be
based primarily on the present and prospective earnings that the corporation could derive
from the use of its assets. Central States Elec. Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879, 884 (4th Cir.
1950); CHOKA, supra note 34, at 51. Market price, however, does not always reflect this
intrinsic value. 2 J. BONBHRGHT, THE VALUATMON OF PROPERTY 824 (1937) [hereinafter cited as
BONBmGHT]; Brudney, supra note 12, at 1038 n.69. Moreover, the market value of a stock is
not necessarily related to the asset value of the corporation. United States v. Burrell, 505 F.2d
904, 910 (5th Cir. 1974). Since the nature of mergers precludes valuation with mathematical
precision, Ahlenius v. Bunn & Humphreys, Inc., 358 11. 155, 192 N.E. 824, 829 (1934); market
price should not be considered the sole indicator of corporate value. Bastian v. Bourns, Inc.,
256 A.2d 680, 683 (Del. Ch. 1969).
4 Whitman, Merger Proxy Statements and Exchange Prospectuses-Suggestions for
Reform, FINANcIAL ANALYSIS J., Sept./Oct. 1973, at 46 [hereinafter cited as Whitman].
5 Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 308. Whereas the "going concern value"
measures the value of the corporation based on the predictable future earnings of that busi-
ness in the context of its present operation, see note 48 supra, "merger value" incorporates
the future earnings derivable from the utilization of the business assets in the radically
different context of the merged entity. See A. DEWING, FINANCIAL POLIc OF CORPORATIONS 306-
07 (1953) [hereinafter cited as DEWING]. Since the context in which the assets will be used
varies from one transaction to the next, the expected earnings and thus the merger value of
a corporation will vary for each proposed merger. See Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.,
259 F.2d 476, .478 (2d Cir. 1958).
11 R. BREALEY, SECuRrrY PIUCES IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET 49 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
BREALEY]; Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 308.
52 Brealey, supra note 51, at 49.
1 Whitman, supra note 49, at 46. In the case of parent-subsidiary mergers, many econ-
omies of scale which result in synergism may be realized in the parent-subsidiary relation-
ship. To the degree that such economies may not exist absent total unity, there is the
possibility of synergism in parent-subsidiary mergers. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 7,
at 308; see Lintner, Expectations, Mergers and Equilibrium in Purely Competitive Securities
Market, 61 AM. EcoN. REv. 101 (1971).
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tive contribution to the synergism created by the particular merger."
Resolution of these conflicting indicators of value is analogous to a
"horse trade."" Each party attempts to establish the highest value for his
corporation inferrable from the evidence while attempting to undervalue
the other corporation. Relative bargaining strength is the final arbitrator
in this process.57 Many factors, however, can offset the usually stronger
financial position of the acquiring firm. First, the board of directors of the
acquired corporation, in effect, may veto any outrageous offer." Second,
the offer must be attractive enough to draw shareholder support sufficient
for ratification."0 Finally, the initial merger offer either may initiate com-
peting bids from other corporations, 1 or cause the management of the
acquired firm to solicit offers. 2 The effect of these factors is to increase the
merger price of acquisition. 3 In most instances, therefore, the acquiring
corporation is compelled to pay a substantial premium over the market
price of the acquired corporation's stock.64
In the parent-subsidiary context, however, many of the forces that play
a role in the negotiation of merger terms are not present. A parent-
subsidiary relationship is created when one corporation acquires a majority
interest in another corporation. 5 This relationship often includes control
of the subsidiary's directors. 6 Thus, when a parent and subsidiary corpora-
tion merge, the parent corporation may sit on both sides of the bargaining
" See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 309-313.
CHOKA, supra note 34, at 72.
Id. at 67-68.
BONBRIGHT, supra note 48, at 817.
'Id.
5' See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 301-02. But see id. at 302 n.12. The vir-
tually total control that corporate management maintains over the proxy machinery skews
shareholder appraisal in favor of managerial recommendations. Id. at 300. Since manage-
ment has unlimited access to the corporate proxy machinery, they may couch their solicita-
tions and recommendations in such terms that shareholder approval or rejection practically
is assured. Id. at 301-04. Moreover, since there is no strong requirement for disclosure of
offers to the shareholders, corporate management may, in effect, discard options which it
does not favor. Id. at 301-02.
10 Id. at 300; see note 42 supra.
11 Id. The offer of one firm to acquire another corporation often illustrates a perceived
undervaluation of the target corporation. Since the potential synergism resulting from a
merger with the target corporation will vary from one proposed transaction to the next, third
corporations often will weigh the potential of a merger with the target firm. See note 50 supra.
The resulting competition may lead to a greater acquisition price. See Stella v. Graham-Paige
Motors Corp., 259 F.2d 476, 478 (2d Cir. 1958).
62 Borden, Going Private, Old Tort, New Tort, or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L. RIv. 987, 1039
(1974).
13 CHOKA, supra note 34, at 68.
6 See Newmark Indus. v. RKO Gen., Inc., 305 F. Supp. 310, 315-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
aff'd, 425 F.2d 328 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970). The premium an acquiring
corporation pays under the merger terms in an arms length transaction may range from 9 to
33% over market price. CHOKA, supra note 34, at 68.
0 Brundey & Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 297.
66 See note 9 supra.
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table.17 The resulting merger terms may be the product of the parent's
unilateral action rather than of arms length negotiation between two self-
interested parties. 8 The bargaining position of the minority shareholders
of the subsidiary as represented by the subsidiary's management is weak-
ened not only by the loss of a managerial veto at the negotiation stage,"9
but also by the loss of the managerial option to consider or solicit compet-
ing offers.7" If the subsidiary's directors are in fact controlled by the parent,
the negotiation of merger terms necessarily must be considered a product
of unilateral action and, as such, illustrates a classic self-dealing problem.
7'
Although the parent corporation owes a fiduciary duty of fairness to the
minority shareholders of its subsidiary, in practice fairness has been held
to require only that the merger terms award the subsidiary's minority
shareholders the value of their holdings in their premerger corporation,
exclusive of any expectation or realization of postmerger gain.1
2
Since the minority shareholders of a subsidiary may not rely on the
unbiased judgment of their mangement, nor on the courts to reconstruct
the equivalent of an arms length transaction, these shareholders must rely'
on their own analysis of the merger terms to protect their interest.73 The
Securities Exchange Act and implementing regulations protect this in-
vestor appraisal right by requiring that merger proxy statements disclose
all information necessary for an adequate understanding of the transac-
tion, and present this information in an easily understandable manner.7
When a parent corporation merges with a subsidiary through manipulation
of the subsidiary's proxy machinery, the courts must provide a right of
recovery to the defrauded minority shareholders. 75 An effective right of
recovery is necessary not only to correct the injury to the minority share-
holders, but also to enforce.the'disclosure requirements of the proxy
regulations.
7
The merger of Mergenthaler Linotype Company (Mergenthaler) and its
subsidiary, the Electric Auto-Lite Company (Auto-Lite), illustrates the
' Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 298.
"Id.
, See note 59 supra.
7o See notes 61-62 supra; see note 72 infra.
71 Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 298.
11 Harriman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 154-55 (D. Del. 1975).
See Brudney and Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 298. There have been suggestions that fairness
in parent-subsidiary mergers requires that the merger terms produce the equivalent of an
arms length agreement. See Chirelstein, Sargeant & Lipton, "Fairness" in Mergers between
Parents and Partly Owned Subsidiaries, in EIrHTH ANN. INST. ON SEcuRrrms REG. 273 276-77
(Mundheim, Fleischmann & Vandegrift ed. 1977) (prepared for the Prac. Law Inst.)
[hereinafter cited as Chirelstein, Sargeant & Lipton]. See also Ervin v. Oregon Ry. and Nav.
Co., 27 F. 625, 630 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886). Thus, fairness should require sharing of postmerger
gains. Ohfr~stein, Sargeant & Lipton, supra at 280. Moreover, not only should the parent
offer the best price it can, but also should solicit competing bids from other corporations. Id.
at 290-92.
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 n.6 (1970).
76 See note 3 supra.
71 See note 16 supra.
76 Id.
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difficulties inherent in providing an effective right of recovery to the de-
frauded minority shareholders of a subsidiary following a merger and the
concomitant difficulties in enforcing the disclosure requirements of the
proxy regulations. In 1962 Mergenthaler proposed a merger in which a new
corporation, Eltra, would be formed by the exchange of outstanding Auto-
Lite and Mergenthaler shares for Eltra preferred and common stock."
Auto-Lite management issued a proxy statement recommending that the
terms be ratified. Charging that the proxy statement failed to disclose
adequately the control that Mergenthaler exercised over Auto-Lite's direc-
tors,78 several Auto-Lite minority shareholders challenged the resulting
merger in a derivative action."
In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,"o the courts found that the minority
shareholders had suffered legal injury as a result of the defective merger
proxy statement that violated section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.1' Because the passage of time and the intervention of third party
interests precluded rescission of the merger, the minority shareholders
were limited to an action for monetary relief.2
An award of monetary relief requires valuation of the corporations as a
prerequisite to discerning the ancillary effects of the fraud.83 In establishing
Although the Mergenthaler/Auto-Lite transaction is described better as a consolida-
tion than a merger, the principal effects are identical. While a merger results in the absorption
of one corporation into another, a consolidation involves two corporations merging there
identities in a newly created third corporation. Fillman, supra note 39, at 837.
"' See note 12 supra.
"' See note 16 supra.
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1967), rev'd, 403 F.2d 429
(7th Cir. 1968), rev'd and remanded, 396 U.S. 375 (1970), No. 63c 113 (N.D. Ill. 1976), rev'd
552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.L.S.W. 3293 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1977) (77-331).
"I See note 3 supra.
2 396 U.S. at 388. The initial action which arose from the Mergenthaler/Auto-Lite
merger in 1963 in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois was based on the
failure to disclose clearly the relationship between Mergenthaler and Auto-Lite in the merger
proxy statement. The District Court found that the proxy statement violated § 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970), and that the plaintiffs had established
the requisite causal link between that violation and the resulting merger. 281 F. Supp. 826,
829 (N.D. Ill. 1967). The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision on the causa-
tion issue. 403 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1968); The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit,
holding that the statutory requirement that the omission or deception be material in order
to establish a violation precluded the necessity of further proof of causation. 396 U.S. 375,
385 (1970). On remand the district court awarded the defendants partial summary judgment
on the rescission issue. The court held that rescission was an impractical remedy nine years
after the merger transpired. In that time, thousands of persons had traded millions of those
shares involved in the original transaction. The court concluded that it would be inequitable
to require innocent purchasers to return those shares, and almost impossible to trace the
original owners. Moreover, any damages suffered as a result of the proxy violation could be
corrected by monetary relief. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,354.
The district court considered several alternative theories on which the minority shareholders
could base a claim for monetary relief. See 552 F.2d at 1241. The court awarded the minority
shareholders damages in the sum of $1,233,918.35 and $740,000 interest. See id.; note 93 infra.
13 See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
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these values, the Seventh Circuit held that where the market price of
corporate stock accurately reflects value, an analysis of other factors indic-
ative of value is not necessary." The court noted that market price repre-
sents the informed appraisal of independent investors of the value of an
enterprise" and that use of other factors to establish a different value
would be economically unsound." Additional factors should be considered
only when manipulative activities render the market price unreliable.87
Since in Mills the minority shareholders were unable to establish manipu-
lation," market price alone served as the basis for all valuations necessary
to the court's analysis.89
When parents and subsidiaries merge as they did in Mills, however,
market price should not be granted so great a presumption of accuracy.
Courts should consider other indications of corporate value at least as
rebuttal evidence to the presumption that the market price of a corpora-
tion's stock accurately measures that corporation's value. ° The burden of
proving market manipulation is often difficult to meet. 1 Moreover, the
parent need not manipulate market price to reap the benefit of a diver-
gence between market price and actual present value. The parent simply
may instigate the merger at such time as to take advantage of coincidental
fluctuations of market price. 2 Since the parent corporation has this con-
trol, there should arise the suspicion that market price may not assay
present value accurately. 3
A more fundamental problem with market price valuation is that the
552 F.2d at 1248.
Id.; see text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
'5552 F.2d at 1248. The argument that use of criteria such as earnings per share as
indicators of value is unsound conflicts with the Seventh Circuit's use of earnings per share
in a damages analysis. Id. at 1243; see text accompanying notes 99-107 infra.
87 552 F.2d at 1248.
"Id.
'Id.
See note 48 supra.
,5 396 U.S. 375, 382 (1970)Y
,2 See G. McCARTHY & R. HEALEY, VALVING A COMPANY 40 (1970).
"See Brudney & Chireistein, supra note 7. The Seventh Circuit's limited valuation
approach is like the approach of many statutory appraisal remedies. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8 § 262(k) (Supp. 1976). Statutory appraisal is intended to act as a corporate peace-
keeping measure rather than as a remedy for an established injury. See note 13 supra. In the
case of a proxy violation, however, there is an established injury, and the need to balance
competing interests diminishes as the equities shift in favor of the injured party. Measure of
Damages, supra note 16, at 371, 883-84 (1974). The courts, therefore, must be flexible in
providing remedies according to the nature of the cases, Ahlenius v. Bunn & Humphreys, Inc.,
358 Ill. 155, 192 N.E. 824, 829 (1934), and the necessity for effective remedies to enforce the
disclosure requirements of the proxy regulations. See note 16 supra; see note 31 supra. In
Mills, the Seventh Circuit based its valuation analysis solely on market price and found that
each share of Auto-Lite stock was worth 2.1 shares of Mergenthaler. 552 F.2d at 1247. In
addition, the Seventh Circuit found that each share of Auto-Lite was worth 2.31 shares of
Eltra common stock. Id. at 1242. On the other hand, the district court had examined value
indicators other than market price and found those values to be 2.35 and 2.25 respectively.
See id. at 1244.
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market value of a corporation's stock may not assess accurately that corpo-
ration's value for the purposes of a merger. The market, correctly or
incorrectly, appraises the value of a corporation in the context of its pres-
ent operation. 5 The peculiarities of a merger, however, may give rise to
operational conditions for the merged entity that create synergism." Since
there is no expectation that these synergistic effects may arise in indepen-
dent operation, the market price of a corporation's stock will not include
the expected synergism. 7 Thus, market price will not reflect the possibility
of a corporation's higher merger value. 8
With valuation premised solely on market price, however, the Seventh
Circuit in Mills considered which effects of the proxy violation were to be
corrected. The court first considered whether a reduction had occurred in
the earnings potential in the holdings of the minority shareholders as a
result of the merger.9 This reduction was to be determined through exami-
nation of the relative postmerger performances of Auto-Lite and Mergen-
thaler.' ® If the ratio of Auto-Lite to Mergenthaler earnings per share was
excessively high when compared to the relative values of the two stocks
under the merger terms,'"' an inference could be drawn that those merger
terms undervalued the future earnings potential of the Auto-Lite subsidi-
ary.'1 Such undervaluation would indicate that the acquisition price of
Auto-Lite under the merger terms was insufficient.
0 3
The postmerger ratio of earnings per share was found to be 4.85/1 over
the ten year period following the merger."' On the other hand, the ratio of
values established by the merger terms, the "effective exchange ratio," was
2.31/1.'11 The court held, however, that a comparison of these figures was
11 See text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
13 See note 46 supra.
Brundey & Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 307-09.
'T Id. at 308-09.
I d.
552 F.2d at 1242.
'0 Id. at 1243.
101 Id.
1"2 Id. The Seventh Circuit held that an excessively high discrepancy between the post-
merger earnings per shares of Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler when compared to the "exchange
ratio," see text accompanying notes 104-106 infra, would raise only a rebuttable inference that
the exchange ratio was insufficient. 552 F.2d at 1244. The minority shareholders would have
to prove the foreseeability of the subsidiary's relative increase in earnings per share. Id.
'3 Id. at 1242.
"04 Id. at 1243. From 1963 until 1972 the Auto-Lite divisions of Eltra earned $122,501,632.
Since there were 1,159,265 Auto-Lite shares outstanding prior to the merger, Auto-Lite's
annual postmerger earnings per share were $10.57. Mergenthaler, on the other hand, earned
$58,827,595 during that period and had 2,698,822 shares outstanding at the time of the
merger. Thus, Mergenthaler's annual earnings per share were $2.18. The ratio of $10.57/$2.18
= 4.81/1. Id.
'1 Id. at 1242. The effective exchange ratio of Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler stock under
the merger terms was based on the average market prices of Eltra common and preferred
stock. Under the merger terms, each share of Auto-Lite held by minority shareholders was
exchanged for 1.88 shares of convertible Eltra preferred. Each share of Mergenthaler was
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valid to determine a reduction in earnings potential only if the Auto-Lite
and Mergenthaler operations remained independent after the merger."6
Since there was considerable evidence that postmerger commingling of
assets and economies of scale arose as a result of the merger, the postmer-
ger earnings statistics were held to be unreliable."0 7
While the reduction in earnings potential effect was based on postmer-
ger earnings, the second effect the Mills court considered was based solely
on data present at the time of the merger. 8 The court chose to examine
whether the price paid the minority shareholders at the time of the merger
was unfair."5 The court sought to discern this effect through a comparison
of the premerger and merger term relative values of one share of Auto-Lite
to one share of Mergenthaler."0 Again, if the premerger price ratio was
excessively high as compared with the exchange ratio under the merger
terms, the price paid the minority shareholders under those terms would
be held insufficient."'
Based on the average market price of Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler
stocks during the six month period preceding the merger, the price ratio
or relative premerger value was established as 2.1/1.12 Since the effective
exchange ratio or relative value under the merger terms was established
as 2.31/1,"1 based on the average market price of Eltra preferred and Eltra
common stock during the one month period following the merger, the price
received by the Auto-Lite minority shareholders was more than ade-
exchanged for one share of Eltra common. Since the market price of Eltra preferred was
$31.06 and that of Eltra common was $25.25, the effective exchange ratio computed to 2.31/1.
Id.
Exchange value of Auto-Lite
Effective Exchange Ratio (E.E.R.) -Exchange value of MgtaLer-Exchange value of Mergenthaler
1.88 X 31.06 58.39
1 X 25.25 25.25
105 Id. at 1243.
'° Id. at 1243-44. If commingling of assets and economies of scale bar evidence of a
reduction in earnings potential, then the reduction in earnings potential theory will never
support a claim for damages in the case of a merger which results in a synergistic gain. See
text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
20 552 F.2d at 1241-48.
t Id. at 1248.
tt Id.
"t Id.
li Id. at 1247-48. The price ratio represents the relative premerger values of one share
of Auto-Lite to one share of Mergenthaler.
Market price of Auto-Lite




SSee note 105 supra.
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quate."' The court held, however, that the price ratio-exchange ratio for-
mulation would not indicate fairness adequately unless any synergistic
gain created by the merger was considered."' Thus, the price received by
the minority shareholders would be held inadequate unless such sharehold-
ers received not only the value of their premerger holdings, but also a share
of the synergistic gain in proportion to their relative contribution to the
merger."'
The amount of this synergistic gain was held to be the difference be-
tween the premerger and postmerger aggregate values of Auto-Lite and
Mergenthaler stock based on the market prices of those stocks averaged
over the six month period prior to the merger, and Eltra preferred and
common stock averaged over the one month period following the merger. 1 7
The "fair exchange ratio" was held to be 2.16 to 1.118 Since the merger
" 552 F.2d at 1249. The "simplest" method of determining the fairness of a merger is a
comparison of the price and exchange ratios. Id. at 1248.
Exchange ratio > price ratio = fairness
2.31 >2.1 Id.
Id.
"' Id. The circuit court adopted the Brudney & Chirelstein thesis for the sharing of
postmerger gains. This thesis is analogous to "the principle which determines the allocation
of investment opportunities in the administration of common trust funds." Brudney & Chirel-
stein, supra note 7, at 320. Their illustration is as follows:
A trustee manages an account for the benefit of X valued at $100 and an account for the
benefit of Y valued at $50. By joining the accounts into a single administrative unit a savings
of $10 may be effected. Fairness dictates that such savings be shared between the parties in
proportion to the values of their accounts.
X + Y = $150
$10 represents a gain of 6.67% on 150.
Thus each beneficiary receives a 6.67% gain in the value of his account or X receives $6.67
and Y receives $3.33. Id. at 319-20.
"1 552 F.2d at 1248. The Seventh Circuit held the amount of synergism created by the
Auto-Lite-Mergenthaler merger to be the difference between premerger and postmerger val-
ues of the combined corporations. Premerger values:
Auto-Lite = Market price per share x no. minority shares
- $52.25 X 532,500 = $27,825,737
Mergenthaler = Market price per share X no. shares
= $24.875 X 2,698,822 = $67,133,197
Aggregate Premerger value = $94,958,934
Postmerger values:
Eltra preferred = exchange value Auto-Lite x no. minority shares
= $58.39 X 532,500 = $31,095,594
Eltra common = exchange value Mergenthaler X no. shares
= $25.25 X 2,698,822 = $68,145,255
Aggregate Postmerger value = $99,240,849
Synergism = $99,240,849 - $94,958,934 = $4,281,915
M' Id. at 1249. The fair exchange ratio is that distribution which allows the minority
shareholders the value of their premerger holdings and a proportionate amount of the gain
resulting from the merger. Id. at 1248. Since Auto-Lite contributed $27,825,737 or 29.3% of




terms provided an exchange ratio of 2.31 to 1,"' the price paid the minority
shareholders was held to be adequate and the dictates of fairness satis-
fied."'
The court's fairness analysis raises several questions. First, comparison
of the price ratio to the exchange ratio measures relative values rather than
the actual value received. Thus, in certain circumstances the minority
shareholders may not receive even the equivalent value of their premerger
holdings.'21 If the merger were to result in a loss and the minority share-
holders suffer a loss in a proportion equal to or less than the parent corpora-
tion, the comparison of premerger to postmerger relative values still would
indicate a fair transaction. '
$27,825,737 + (.293 x $4,281,915) = $29,080,338
The fair exchange ratio was then derived as follows:
[Fair exchange value of all Auto-Lite minority shares]
[exchange value of Mergenthaler]
No. of Auto-Lite Minority Shares
($29,080,338/$25.25) 532,550 = 2.16/1 Id. at 1248-49. This formulation is erroneous. The
adjustment of the exchange value of all Auto-Lite minority shares from $31,095,594, see note
117 supra, to $29,080,338 must be accompanied by a corresponding adjustment in the ex-
change value of all Mergenthaler shares from $68,145,255, see note 117 supra, to $70,160,511.
Aggregate post merger value - fair exchange value of all Auto-Lite shares
$99,249,849 - $29,080,338 = $70,160,511
The fair exchange value of one share of Mergenthaler must be adjusted accordingly to 25.996.
Fair exchange value of all Mergenthaler shares - no. of shares
$70,150,511 - 2,698,822 = $25,996
The fair exchange ratio, then, should be derived as follows:
[Fair exchange value of all Auto-Lite minority shares -- fair exchange value of
one share of Mergenthaler] no. of Auto-Lite minority shares
($29,080,338/$25.996 - 532,550 = 2.111
The fair exchange ratio, which includes a proportionate sharing of the merger synergisms, by
definition must equal the ratio of premerger values, or in this case the "price ratio." See
Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 320. Although the court's error proved to be harmless,
see text accompanying note 21 infra, the Seventh Circuit was a victim of the same "circular
reasoning" as it noted in the district court's fairness analysis. See 552 F.2d at 1244 n.6.
", Id. at 1242. See note 105 supra.
' 552 F.2d at 1249.
M2 See notes 105, 112, 114 supra.
'1 Consider the following example:
A = 9, B = 6 Total Value = 15
A and B merge and the following loss in value' occurs.
A' = 6, B' = 3 Total Value = 9
A
Price ratio - -- 1.5/1
A'
Exchange ratio - = 2/1 > 1.5/1
Thus, the merger seems to be fair. In a simple fairness context the Brudney and Chirelstein
thesis would be of no assistance. To award minority shareholders the benefits of a trans-
action while burdening such shareholders with none of the risks of the transaction would be
inequitable. In the context of a proxy violation, however, a court might award some measure
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Furthermore, the court used the'same market prices to establish the
amount of synergism as were used in establishing the price and exchange
ratios.ln The exchange ratio incorporated the amount of the synergistic
gain, 24 and the comparison of the price and exchange ratios already re-
flected the distribution of that gain.128 Since synergism was measured by
the same market prices used to establish the price and exchange ratios, the
court's further examination of that gain was unnecessary. An effective
sharing of postmerger gains necessitates isolation of that gain based on
postmerger data.'12 Since the fairness analysis as applied by the court is
intended to exclude postmerger performance data, the sharing of postmer-
ger gain is both inappropriate and impossible.'1
The most serious problem with the Mills court's fairness analysis also
applies to the court's reduction in earnings potential analysis. Both mone-
tary relief theories may be ineffective in remedying the injury suffered by
the minority shareholders. 28 Since both approaches attempt to correct any
unfairness of the merger transaction as evidenced by an inadequate acquis-
of actual damages based on A's out-of-pocket loss, see note 28 supra, or the difference in
value between A and A' premised on the theory that B's fraudulent conduct deprived A of
his appraisal right. See Swanson v. American Consumers Indus., Inc., 475 F.2d 516, 521
(7th Cir. 1973). Moreover, these remedies will not suffice when market price incorrectly
measures the actual values of corporations. Consider the following example: A has an actual
value of 30, but a market price of 20. B has an actual value and market price of 50. If A and
B merge and value is premised on market price, A loses 10.
If a Brudney & Chirelstein analysis is applied, and the postmerger market perceives the
initial undervaluation as synergy, A still loses.
Premerger value of A + B 70
Postmerger value of A + B = 80
Under the sharing thesis A should receive 20 + (2/7 x 10) = 22.85. Since theinitial underval-
uation is incorporated in the proportion of A's contribution to premerger value (2/7), A's loss
increases under the Brudney & Chirelstein thesis with the occurrence of actual as well as
perceived synergy.
70 (premerger A + B) + 10 (initial undervaluation perceived as synergy) + 20 (actual
synergy) = 100. A, then, receives 20 + (2/7 x 30) = 28.57. Were there no initial undervalua-
tion, however, A would receive 30 + (% x 20) = 37.5. Thus, when there is no actual synergy,
A loses 30 - 22.85 = 7.15. With an increment of actual synergy, however, A loses 37.5 -28.57
or 8.93. Remedies based on the adequacy of a merger acquisition price simply will not cor-
rect any deficiencies in the valuation process. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 7, at
345-46.
in See notes 105, 112 supra.
121 See note 105 supra.
'" See note 118 supra. Since the exchange ratio in Mills was computed on postmerger
stock prices, comparison of that exchange ratio to the premerger price ratio essentially incor-
porated, as self executing, the Brudney & Chirelstein fairness test. See Brudney & Chirel-
stein, supra note 7, at 310 n.36.
12 Id. at 308.
2 552 F.2d at 1241. Although Brudney and Chirelstein noted that their sharing formula
presented no significantly greater problems in implementation than other remedies, Brudney
& Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 323, others have argued that difficulty in isolating the synergis-
tic element limited the sharing thesis to prospective application, Chirelstein, Sargeant &
Lipton, supra note 72, at 280-90.
02 See text accompanying notes 99-120 supra.
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ition price,"' fairness of the transaction as evidenced by an adequate price
is a complete defense to the original proxy violation. Yet courts have held
that fairness may not stand as a complete defense to a proxy violation.3 '
In addition, the fairness and reduction in earnings potential methods may
confront the plaintiff minority shareholders with burdens of proof they are
not able to meet. 3' The resulting ineffectual remedy seems "to insulate
from private redress an entire category of proxy violations .... 11112
The effects of a merger are not limited to the harm suffered by the
plaintiffs. Since a remedy based on the inadequacy of the price appears to
be ineffective in the Mills context, courts should look to other possibilities.
Such effects may include the benefits the wrongdoer receives as a result of
his illegality.3 3 This changed focus is necessary for several reasons. First,
the loss of an effective appraisal right by the minority shareholders may
be seen as the gain of the fraudulent party.'3 Second, and more impor-
tantly, allowing the wrongdoer to retain the fruits of his illegality affirms
the wrong and defeats the preventive purpose of the proxy regulations. 3'
Consequently, such effects of the merger should be excised.
The Mills court did discuss several cases requiring that a wrongdoer
disgorge the profits proximately resulting from his fraudulent conduct.3 '
Whether such profits were foreseeable or speculative was held to be unim-
portant in cases in which a party had been induced through fraud to
dispose of his property.'37 Courts will award the defrauded party a windfall
rather than allow the wrongdoer to retain the fruits of his illegality. 38 The
Seventh Circuit, however, rejected the contention of the minority share-
holders that the measure of the wrongdoer's profits should be the sum of
assets siphoned off the Auto-Lite subsidiary. 3 '
The court's analysis should not have ended at that point. Both the
earnings potential reduction theory and the fairness theory should have
been examined from the perspective of the wrongdoer.4 ° A reasonable in-
ference could be drawn from the postmerger earnings-per-share ratio that
profit from the merger had been realized.' Whether this profit resulted
12 Id.
,3 See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1970); note 36 supra.
' 396 U.S. at 382; see Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 7, at 309 n.34.
2 396 U.S. at 382.
' See note 31 supra.
' Id.
' See text accompanying notes 16-32 supra.
' 552 F.2d at 1242-43.
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155-56 (1972); Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1303-07 (2d Cir. 1973); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781,
786-87 (1st Cir. 1965); see Rice v. Price, 340 Mass. 502, 164 N.E.2d 891, 894-97 (1960); 3 L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATONS 1793 (2d ed. 1961); 5 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 507, 508,
508.1 (1967); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 151, 202 and Comments b,c (1937);
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 549 (1977).
' See note 31 supra.
'' 552 F.2d at 1243.
"' Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1305 (2d Cir. 1973).
"' Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1243 (7th Cir. 1977).
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from commingling should not be important.' Furthermore, whether those
profits were foreseeable is irrelevant when the analysis shifts from the
plaintiffs damages to the defendant's profits.'4 If the minority sharehold-
ers did not receive this profit, 4 it must have accrued to the wrongdoer, and
he should be made to disgorge this gain as the fruits of the fraudulently
effected merger.'
By the same reasoning, the methodology of the court's fairness analysis
could have been used to determine the effect of the merger on Mergen-
thaler.' 4' Since the shares of the wrongdoer corporation increased in value
as a result of the merger,'4 7 that increment in value should be excised and
awarded the minority shareholders. Moreover, since the disgorging remedy
principally is intended to deprive the wrongdoer of his profits,' the gain
realized by the minority shareholders through the fraudulently induced
merger should be irrelevant.'
Although excessive application of this remedy in a case such as Mills
clearly works a hardship on the shareholders of the parent corporation,' 5
reasonable application of this remedial device may be necessary to provide
not only an effective remedy for loss of the investor appraisal right, but also
a means to ensure further compliance with the proxy regulation disclosure
requirements.' 5' A remedy based solely on the inadequacy of the price
afforded the minority shareholders may be insufficient for such purposes.
First, the injury that the minority has suffered is not unfair treatment
under the merger terms, but rather is deprivation of the right to decide
whether those terms are sufficiently fair.'52 Second, there may be unusual
difficulties in rebutting the defendant corporation's evidence and proving
damages.'5 3 Finally, if a corporation may violate the proxy regulations to
its benefit with impunity the requirements of those proxy regulations lose
all meaning. '
The remedy afforded defrauded minority shareholders in cases similar
"I Marcus v. Otis, 169 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1948).
"5 Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965). While the defrauded seller may
be awarded the wrongdoer's profits, when a party is induced to buy property fraudulently,
he does not have that remedy and is limited to actual damages. Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439
F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971); Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962).
"I See note 104 supra.
" Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965).
,46 See text accompanying notes 109-121 supra.
" See note 107 supra. Each Mergenthaler share gained $0.375 as a result of the fraudu-
lently induced transaction. Id.
M See Falk v. Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199, 201-02, 135 N.E. 243 (1922); People v. Schmidt,
216 N.Y. 324, 341, 110 N.E. 945, 950 (1915).
"5 Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965).
"5 See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1304 (2d Cir. 1973).
See Falk v. Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199, 201-02, 135 N.E. 243 (1922).
11 See notes 12, 13 supra.




to Mills clearly is dependent on which analysis a court utilizes. Since the
parent-subsidiary merger presents a potential seedbed for future proxy
violations due to the nature of parent-subsidiary relationships, 5 ' as well
as a complex remedy problem due to the nature of the transaction, 5 ' a
flexible and, perhaps, punitive approach seems demanded. 5 Failure of
courts to exercise such an approach may indicate a further development
in the enforceability and, therefore, the scope of the proxy regulations.
Perhaps those regulations currently require either adequate disclosure or
a fair transaction as determined by minimal standards. While this inter-
pretation, contrary to both the express purpose of the proxy regulations
and the stated policy on fairness as a federal cause of action, 58 may be
premature, the Supreme Court did refuse to grant certiorari on the Mills
appeal.' 5' Until the Supreme Court reconsiders these issues or lower
courts provide a greater rationale for what are obviously policy laden
decisions, the results in the cases will continue to conflict with the stated
policies of the proxy regulations.
RICHARD A. DAVIS
'I See text accompanying notes 6-15 supra.
'5 See text accompanying notes 37-73 supra.
'5 See notes 5, 16 supra.
' See notes 13, 32 supra.
'5' In August of 1977, the plaintiff shareholders in Mills filed a petition for certiorari to
the Supreme Court. The petition presented several questions. First, plaintiffs questioned
whether the fairness of a merger should be determined solely and conclusively by stock
market prices shortly before and after the transaction, particularly in cases where the defen-
dant controls terms and time of the transaction. Second, the shareholders questioned whether
damages under § 28 of the Securities Exchange Act are measured by the defendant's profits.
46 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Aug. 31, 1977) (77-331). In late October the Court declined to review
these questions. Id. at 3293 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1977).
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